The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most
important political documents of the 20th century, made explicit that
countries with nuclear arms would not tolerate the spread of those arms around
the world. It is no wonder then that the United States constantly voices its
condemnation of Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, citing the
Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as a fear of irrational Islamic actors. While
these fears may have some basis in reality, I would argue that the true danger
of Iranian nuclear proliferation lies in the possibility of Iranian nuclear
weapons weakening and destroying the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction
itself.
Despite
widespread opposition to the idea of Iranian nuclear weapons, many individuals
currently assert that nuclear weapons in Iran would create a bipolar power
system, one that promotes stability, and therefore should be allowed in Iran.
Highlighting the, albeit tenuous, peace accords struck between the United
States and the USSR during the Cold War and the recent peace between Pakistan
and India, these advocates believe nuclear weapons will lead to a much more
stable system of power in the Middle East. Put simply, they argue, “once Iran
crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply… and the current crisis
will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is
today” (Sokolski 203). However, many activists and politicians on the other
side argue that Iranian nuclear proliferation would not lead to stability in
the Middle East, but destruction. These activists assert that Iran is an
irrational actor in an area fraught with extremists, and so nuclear weapons in
the hands of Iran would likely end up being used on innocent civilians in the
West. Furthermore, these individuals argue that Iran occupies a position on top
of oil reserves, and as such could pose an economic as well as a military
threat to the United States if their nuclear weapons were allowed to develop. Essentially,
these more realist actors argue that being permissive towards Iranian Nuclear
weapons will lead to “More Nuclear Proliferation” (Sokolski 203), “Higher Oil
Prices” (Sokolski 204), and “Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminished U.S.
Influence” (Sokolski 204).
I would
agree that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons, but for radically different
reasons. I believe the danger in Iranian weapons is not the danger that Iran
itself would pose to the West with them, but rather the danger of destroying
the tenets of mutually assured destruction. It is generally agreed that
mutually assured destruction (MAD) exists on the principle that if large-scale
conflict ensures between two nuclear powers, nuclear weapons will soon be used.
For instance, during the Cuban Missile crisis, the possibility of the
destruction of Florida and other Southern States nearly escalated to the
possible nuclear destruction of the world. Under MAD, totally world destruction
will follow under any kind of invasion or military action between two nuclear
powers. Thanks, in part, to this principle, direct war between superpowers is a
thing of the past, as no superpower is willing to risk utter destruction in such
a manner. While this principle may seem sound on the surface, upon further
investigation it is revealed to be fallacious. Take the current NATO situation
in Eastern Europe, where Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are raising serious
questions about the ability of NATO to protect them. According to NATO treaties,
countries like the United States and United Kingdom, nuclear powers, would be
required to counter any Russian aggression in these countries, an action that
would doubtlessly risk nuclear destruction. This begs the question: If Russia
attacks an eastern NATO country, will the United States really intervene,
destroying the entire world in the name of a piece of paper? The clear answer
appears to be no, no one in the United States would or should be willing to
destroy themselves and the 7 billion citizens of the Earth in the name of
preserving the autonomy of roughly 2 million Latvians. I would venture to say
that the same could be true of roughly any military engagement across the world.
Even if Florida, California, or Massachusetts were invaded, I would not want to
invite the destruction of the entire world to spite such an invasion. Such an
action would be equivalent akin to nuking one’s nose to spite the face. Ultimately,
the more nuclear deterrent situations there are, the greater the probability that
one country will eventually call what I will say is the MAD bluff. For
instance, the hatred between Iran and Israel may grow to such a point where
they are out for blood, but not total destruction, and the two states may
simply agree to engage in large-scale war and not use nuclear weapons. Neither
side would have a reason to use nuclear weapons until the other’s government and
people were almost destroyed, and so huge swathes of destruction could ensue up
to this point. Ultimately, this could cause the system of nuclear deterrence to
break down and warfare to continue as it did before nuclear weapons. States
could act ignorant of nuclear weapons, and, in the words of Schelling, a world
without nuclear weapons “would be a nervous world” (Schelling 4). The world could fall back to a
state when World Wars between superpowers raged rampant and the world once
again was bathed in blood and anarchy.
Due to this
possibility, nuclear weapons in Iran should be avoided; not due to Iran’s
particular politics, religion, or economics, but rather because any nuclear
proliferation at all risks the collapse of MAD, a system which has prevented
World War and protected the lives of world citizens for the last decades.