An Unconventional Reason Against Iranian Nuclear Weapons

         The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, one of the most important political documents of the 20^th century, made explicit that countries with nuclear arms would not tolerate the spread of those arms around the world. It is no wonder then that the United States constantly voices its condemnation of Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, citing the Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as a fear of irrational Islamic actors. While these fears may have some basis in reality, I would argue that the true danger of Iranian nuclear proliferation lies in the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons weakening and destroying the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction itself.

            Despite widespread opposition to the idea of Iranian nuclear weapons, many individuals currently assert that nuclear weapons in Iran would create a bipolar power system, one that promotes stability, and therefore should be allowed in Iran. Highlighting the, albeit tenuous, peace accords struck between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War and the recent peace between Pakistan and India, these advocates believe nuclear weapons will lead to a much more stable system of power in the Middle East. Put simply, they argue, “once Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, deterrence will apply… and the current crisis will finally dissipate, leading to a Middle East that is more stable than it is today” (Sokolski 203). However, many activists and politicians on the other side argue that Iranian nuclear proliferation would not lead to stability in the Middle East, but destruction. These activists assert that Iran is an irrational actor in an area fraught with extremists, and so nuclear weapons in the hands of Iran would likely end up being used on innocent civilians in the West. Furthermore, these individuals argue that Iran occupies a position on top of oil reserves, and as such could pose an economic as well as a military threat to the United States if their nuclear weapons were allowed to develop. Essentially, these more realist actors argue that being permissive towards Iranian Nuclear weapons will lead to “More Nuclear Proliferation” (Sokolski 203), “Higher Oil Prices” (Sokolski 204), and “Increased Terrorism Designed to Diminished U.S. Influence” (Sokolski 204).   

            I would agree that Iran should not possess nuclear weapons, but for radically different reasons. I believe the danger in Iranian weapons is not the danger that Iran itself would pose to the West with them, but rather the danger of destroying the tenets of mutually assured destruction. It is generally agreed that mutually assured destruction (MAD) exists on the principle that if large-scale conflict ensures between two nuclear powers, nuclear weapons will soon be used. For instance, during the Cuban Missile crisis, the possibility of the destruction of Florida and other Southern States nearly escalated to the possible nuclear destruction of the world. Under MAD, totally world destruction will follow under any kind of invasion or military action between two nuclear powers. Thanks, in part, to this principle, direct war between superpowers is a thing of the past, as no superpower is willing to risk utter destruction in such a manner. While this principle may seem sound on the surface, upon further investigation it is revealed to be fallacious. Take the current NATO situation in Eastern Europe, where Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are raising serious questions about the ability of NATO to protect them. According to NATO treaties, countries like the United States and United Kingdom, nuclear powers, would be required to counter any Russian aggression in these countries, an action that would doubtlessly risk nuclear destruction. This begs the question: If Russia attacks an eastern NATO country, will the United States really intervene, destroying the entire world in the name of a piece of paper? The clear answer appears to be no, no one in the United States would or should be willing to destroy themselves and the 7 billion citizens of the Earth in the name of preserving the autonomy of roughly 2 million Latvians. I would venture to say that the same could be true of roughly any military engagement across the world. Even if Florida, California, or Massachusetts were invaded, I would not want to invite the destruction of the entire world to spite such an invasion. Such an action would be equivalent akin to nuking one’s nose to spite the face. Ultimately, the more nuclear deterrent situations there are, the greater the probability that one country will eventually call what I will say is the MAD bluff. For instance, the hatred between Iran and Israel may grow to such a point where they are out for blood, but not total destruction, and the two states may simply agree to engage in large-scale war and not use nuclear weapons. Neither side would have a reason to use nuclear weapons until the other’s government and people were almost destroyed, and so huge swathes of destruction could ensue up to this point. Ultimately, this could cause the system of nuclear deterrence to break down and warfare to continue as it did before nuclear weapons. States could act ignorant of nuclear weapons, and, in the words of Schelling, a world without nuclear weapons “would be a nervous world”  (Schelling 4). The world could fall back to a state when World Wars between superpowers raged rampant and the world once again was bathed in blood and anarchy.

            Due to this possibility, nuclear weapons in Iran should be avoided; not due to Iran’s particular politics, religion, or economics, but rather because any nuclear proliferation at all risks the collapse of MAD, a system which has prevented World War and protected the lives of world citizens for the last decades.